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L STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Appellants, Terry Frank ("Frank") and Park City Pharmacy, Inc. ("PCP"), were not parties 
in the trial court action below, but the target of improperly issued and executed subpoenas. PCP 
and Frank appeal the final order of Judge Pat B. Brian entered on 15 October 1996 in Case No. 
954300067 DA, Third Judicial District Court, Summit County, State of Utah. 
Frank's and PCP's Notice of Appeal was filed on 14 November 1996, and is timely 
pursuant to Rule 4(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure ("URCP"). 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 
78-2a-3(2)(h). 
n. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The present Appeal focuses on the improper issuance and execution of subpoenas by a 
party's attorney, and a party's attorney's legal secretary. PCP and Frank present three (3) issues 
of first impression for the Utah Court of Appeals in this Appeal: 
ISSUE NO. 1: Did the trial court err in failing to find that Defendant's attorney, 
Mitchell J. Olsen ("Mr. Olsen"), breached his duty to PCP by subpoenaing all of PCP's 
confidential bank records for the past three years directly from PCP's banks: 
(1) where PCP has a constitutionally protected right of privacy in respect to its 
confidential banking records; 
(2) where Mr. Olsen obtained PCP's banking records directly from PCP's 
banks, without providing PCP any "prior notice" as the Utah Constitution 
and Rule 45, URCP, require; and 
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(3) where Mr. Olsen failed to provide PCP's banks with notice of their rights 
to object to the subpoena, as required by Rule 45, URCP, and exemplified 
by URCP Form 30 "Notice to Persons Served with a Subpoena"? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: PCP and Frank believe that this issue is a matter of 
first impression for the Utah Court of Appeals. The failure of the trial court to make 
findings on all material issues is reversible error unless the facts in the record are clear, 
uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding in favor of the result reached. 
Butler v. Pinecrest Pipeline Operating Co.. 909 P.2d 225, 231-32 (Utah 1995) (remanding 
for findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding sanctions award). Whether the 
district court properly found that URCP 45 was not violated in this case is a question of 
statutory interpretation which the Supreme Court reviews for correctness giving the trial 
court's conclusions of law no deference. Beynon v. St. George-Dixie Lodge 1743. 854 
P.2d 513 (Utah 1993); Avila v. Winn. 794 P.2d 20 (Utah 1990) (question of whether a 
party has failed to comply with the requirements of the rules of civil procedure sufficient 
to justify dismissal are questions of law and are reviewed for correctness with no 
particular deference to the determinations of law made by the trial court; Hartford Leasing 
Corp. v. State. 888 P.2d 694 (Utah App. 1994) cert den., 899 P.2d 1231 (1995) (trial 
court's interpretation of a rule in the Code of Judicial Administration presents a question 
of law which is reviewed for correctness); Richards Irr. Co. v. Karren. 880 P.2d 6 (1994) 
(the propriety of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is a question of law given no deference to the 
trial court's ruling). 
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ISSUE NO. 2: Did the trial court err in failing to find that the subpoena duces 
tecum and deposition notice served upon Frank were void ab initio, issued in violation of Rule 
45, URCP, and issued in violation of Rule 11, URCP: 
(1) where only the Clerk of the Court and "[a]n attorney admitted to practice 
in the court in which the action is pending . . . as an officer of the court" 
may issue and sign subpoenas pursuant to Rules 11 and 45, URCP; 
(2) where only attorneys ox pro se litigants may issue and sign deposition 
notices pursuant to Rules 11, 26, and 30, URCP; and 
(3) where Mr. Olsen's legal secretary issued and signed the subpoena duces 
tecum and deposition notice served upon Frank? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: PCP and Frank believe that this issue is a matter of 
firs impression for the Utah Court of Appeals. The failure of the trial court to make 
findings on all material issues is reversible error unless the facts in the record are clear, 
uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding in favor of the result reached. 
Butler v. Pinecrest Pipeline Operating Co.. 909 P.2d 225, 231-32 (Utah 1995) (remanding 
for findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding sanctions award). Whether the 
district court properly found that URCP 45 was not violated in this case is a question of 
statutory interpretation which the Supreme Court reviews for correctness giving the trial 
court's conclusions of law no deference. Beynon v. St. George-Dixie Lodge 1743. 854 
P.2d 513 (Utah 1993); Avila v. Winn. 794 P.2d 20 (Utah 1990) (question of whether a 
party has failed to comply with the requirements of the rules of civil procedure sufficient 
to justify dismissal are questions of law and are reviewed for correctness with no 
particular deference to the determinations of law made by the trial court; Hartford Leasing 
Corp. v. State. 888 P.2d 694 (Utah App. 1994) cert, den., 899 P.2d 1231 (1995) (trial 
court's interpretation of a rule in the Code of Judicial Administration presents a question 
of law which is reviewed for correctness); Richards Irr. Co. v. Karren. 880 P.2d 6 (1994) 
(the propriety of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is a question of law given no deference to the 
trial court's ruling). 
ISSUE NO. 3: Did the trial court err in failing to award Frank and PCP the costs 
and attorneys fees they incurred in filing and prosecuting their Motion for Protective Order, 
Motion to Quash, and Motion for Sanctions, and in not imposing sanctions against Defendant 
and/or Mr. Olsen, where Mr. Olsen demonstrated a clear pattern and practice of wantonly 
misusing the subpoena power vested in him as an officer of the court? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: PCP and Frank believe that the standard for issuing 
sanctions for violations of Rule 45 is a matter of first impression for the Utah Court of 
Appeals. In respect to Rule 11, the Court of Appeals applies a three-pronged standard of 
review. First, the trial court's findings of fact are reviewed under the clearly erroneous 
standard. Second, the trial court's ultimate conclusion of the Rule 11 violation is 
reviewed under the correction of errors standard. Third, the trial court's determination as 
to the type and amount of sanctions to be imposed is reviewed under the abuse of 
discretion standard. Barnard v. Sutliff 846 P.2d 1229 (Utah 1992). 
HI, DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
1. Rule 11, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; Addendum, Exhibit 11. 
2. Rule 30, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; Addendum, Exhibit 18. 
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3. Rule 45, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; Addendum, Exhibit 19. 
4. Article I, Section 14, Utah Constitution; Addendum, Exhibit 2Q. 
5. Form 30 Notice to Persons Served with a Subpoena; Addendum, Exhibit 2. 
IV. STATEMENT OF CASE 
On 17 May 1995, Clifford E. Holt ("Plaintiff") filed a complaint for divorce against 
Appellee, Audrey N. Holt ("Defendant"). The trial court divorce proceeding was highly 
contested and hostile. For a divorce proceeding, Defendant pursued unusually extensive non-
party discovery, primarily through the use of subpoenas. 
Appellants were not parties to the trial court action, but were the target of Defendant's 
non-party subpoena discovery. Appellant, Mr. Terrance E. Frank ("Frank"), is the sole owner of 
Appellant, Park City Pharmacy, Inc. ("PCP"). PCP employed Plaintiff. As a theory of her case, 
Defendant doggedly insisted that Plaintiffs income and assets were greater than the amount 
Plaintiff declared. Defendant, for example, argued that Plaintiff had become an owner of PCP. 
Frank voluntarily supplied Defendant with an affidavit testifying that Frank was the sole owner of 
PCP, and that Plaintiff was an employee only. This did not satisfy Defendant. Thus, Defendant 
aggressively sought extensive (and grossly over-broad) discovery from PCP, and custodians of 
PCP's confidential and sensitive financial records. 
The Utah Supreme Court recognized in State v. Thompson, infra, that persons are 
constitutionally protected against "unreasonable searches and seizures of their bank statements, 
checks, bonds, loan applications, loan guarantees, and all papers which [they] supplied to the bank 
to facilitate the conduct of [their] financial affairs upon a reasonable assumption that the 
information would remain confidential." Unfortunately, in their zealous defense of the divorce 
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action, Defendant and her attorney, Mitchell J. Olsen ("Mr. Olsen") trampled PCP's constitutional 
right of privacy in its banking records. Defendant, through Mr. Olsen, surreptitiously and secretly 
subpoenaed PCP's banking records directly from PCP's banks, without providing PCP the prior 
notice before the execution of the subpoena required by the Utah Constitution and Rule 45. 
Therefore, PCP had no opportunity to object to Mr. Olsen's subpoenas. PCP had no opportunity 
to test the constitutional validity of Mr. Olsen's subpoenas. PCP had no opportunity to obtain a 
protective order to prevent unrestricted public disclosure of PCP's sensitive and confidential 
financial information. 
Aside from failing to provide PCP prior notice of the subpoena of its private banking 
records, Defendant, through Mr. Olsen, also failed to provide PCP's banks served with subpoenas 
a copy of Form 30 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, entitled "Notice to Person Served With 
a Subpoena." Among other things, the Form 30 Notice provides that the nonparty has the "right 
to object if the subpoena . . . (c) requires you to disclose a trade secret or other confidential 
research, development, or commercial information . . ." (Emphasis added.) Without the Form 
30 Notice, PCP's banks were not put on notice of their right to object on behalf of PCP. 
Correspondingly, the subpoenaed banks did not notify PCP or Frank of their right to object, nor 
that their banking records were to be disclosed. 
As a product of unconstitutional search and seizure, Defendant obtained all of PCP's 
banking records covering a period of three years. Defendant non-confidentially used PCP's 
private banking records to advocate her position in the divorce action and publicly published some 
of PCP's confidential banking records by using them in a deposition. Defendant's conduct, 
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through Mr. Olsen, was wanton ex parte illegal and abusive use of the subpoena power vested in 
Mr. Olsen as an officer of the court. Defendant and/or Mr. Olsen should be seriously sanctioned 
for this egregious misconduct. 
Defendant's abuse of Mr. Olsen's subpoena power did not stop there. Mr. Olsen 
purported to authorize his secretary to issue and sign subpoenas, subpoenas duces tecum, and 
deposition notices. Indeed, Defendant sought to subpoena the presence of Mr. Frank at a 
deposition and the production of Frank's confidential and proprietary financial records through a 
subpoena duces tecum and deposition notice issued and signed by Mr. Olsen's legal secretary. 
The subpoena power of the court has been jealously guarded. Historically, only the Clerk 
of the Court was allowed to issue subpoenas. In 1994, Rule 45(a)(3), URCP was amended to 
allow "an attorney admitted to practice in the court in which the action is pending" to issue and 
sign subpoenas "as an officer of the court." Mr. Olsen's legal secretary is not licensed to practice 
law. She is not a Clerk of the Court. She is not an officer of the Court. Mr. Olsen's irresponsible 
delegation to his secretary is a facial and blatant violation of Rules 11 and 45, URCP It also 
constitutes the unethical sponsoring of the unauthorized practice of law. Utah courts cannot 
acquiesce or sponsor such disrespect for the subpoena power vested in attorneys as officers of the 
court. Mr. Olsen's improper delegation should subject him to severe sanctions. 
The examples cited above are but a part of the Defendant's pattern and practice, through 
Mr. Olsen, of wantonly abusing the subpoena power vested in Mr. Olsen as an officer of the 
court. For specifics, see the Statement of Facts, infra. Under these circumstances, Defendant 
and/or Mr. Olsen should receive the most severe in the spectrum of sanctions. Litigants and their 
attorneys have an absolute duty to minimize the burden on non-parties who may possess 
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information relevant to their lawsuit. Defendant and Mr. Olsen ignored this duty, and over 
zealously elevated Defendant's interests above PCP's and Frank's rights. Defendant and Mr. 
Olsen should thus be sanctioned in an amount sufficient to compensate PCP and Frank for the 
attorney fees and costs they have incurred to raise and resolve these issues with the court. 
Further, as a penalty and source of deterrent, Defendant and Mr. Olsen should also be issued a 
punitive sanction. 
V. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. DEFENDANT OBTAINED PCP'S CONFIDENTIAL AND PROPRIETARY 
COMMERCIAL INFORMATION (1) WITHOUT PROVIDING PCP THE 
REQUIRED ,fPRIOR NOTICE11, AND (2) WITHOUT INFORMING 
SUBPOENAED PARTY OF THEIR RIGHT TO OBJECT (FORM 30). 
1. On 17 May 1995, Clifford E. Holt ("Plaintiff') filed a Complaint for divorce against 
the Appellee, Audrey N. Holt ("Defendant") R. 1-6.1 Defendant filed her Answer and 
Counterclaim on 21 July 1995. R. 7-18. Plaintiff filed his Answer to the Counterclaim on 31 July 
1995. R. 24-25. 
2. Because this Appeal focuses on the improper use of subpoenas in non-party 
discovery, a brief introduction of Defendant's counsel is appropriate. Defendant was represented 
by Mitchell J. Olsen of the law firm Olsen & Olsen L.L.C. ("Mr. Olsen"). Mr. Olsen is an 
experienced domestics law attorney. He has practiced since 1982 (more than 14 years) (R. 785) 
and charges $150.00 per hour in domestic cases.(R. 786). 
xFor convenience, Appellants will refer to the record page numbers as "R. [page 
number]." 
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* Plaintiff Defendant's divorce proceeding was highly contested and hostile. 
For instance, Plaintiff certified, under oath, that Defendant disparaged Plaintiff with his children 
(K, 33 -3 /, 38-40) and harassed Plaintiff through hv pU< c nl einpl uiinnii ii ^ppHKnil, P.nk I ih 
Pharmacy, Inc. (HPCPM). Plaintiff testified: 
The Defendant has engaged in a continuous course of activity designed to 
disparage this affiant and to interfere with his employment. Specifically, the 
Defendant calls the affiants place of employment and harasses other 
employees regarding this affiants whereabouts or activities. The Defendant's 
action are disruptive to the other employees at this affiant's place of 
employment. 
P naragraph 13. 
4. Based upon Defendant's conduct and upon motion, the trial court issued the 
folio v ii ig I\ lii ii ite Ei lti j Oi dei (R 155): .
 ;. . • • _ . , ; • 
COURT FINDS AND MAKES TEMPORARY ORDER AS READ INTO 
THE RECORD, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO: 
DEFENDANT IS NOT TO MAKE DISPARAGING REMARKS NOR 
TALK ABOUT THIS LITIGATION WHEN CHILDREN ARE PRESENT 
OR A CHANGE IN CUSTODY MAY OCCUR AT THE TIME OF TRIAL 
[DEFENDANT HAD TEMPORARY CUSTODY OF THE CHILDREN]. 
TsTEITHER TO oiSPOSL Ut PAPfcR OR MARI I AL ASSE IS AND 
STIPULATION TO MUTUAL RESTRAINING ORDER INCLUDING AT 
EMPLOYMENT PLACES. (Emphasis original.) 
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5. For a divorce proceeding, Defendant pursued unusually extensive non-party 
discovery through the use of subpoenas, subpoenas duces tecum, notices of deposition and notices 
of records deposition, most of which are specifically identified as follows: 
(1.) 
**(2.) 
(3.) 
(4.) 
*(5.) 
**(6.) 
**(7.) 
**(8.) 
*(9.) 
*(io.) 
*(11.) 
*(12.) 
•(13.) 
**(14.) 
(15.) 
(16.) 
(17.) 
(18.) 
**(19.) 
(20.) 
(21.) 
(22.) 
(23.) 
(24.) 
(25.) 
(26.) 
*(27.) 
(28.) 
**(29.) 
(30.) 
(31.) 
**(32.) 
Record Page No. 
R. 198-199 
R. 252-254 
R. 255-257 
R. 258-259 
R. 260-261 
R. 262-264 
R. 265-267 
R. 268-270 
R. 271-272 
R. 273-274 
R. 275-276 
R. 277-278 
R. 279-280 
R. 281-283 
R. 284-286 
R. 287-289 
R. 290-291 
R. 292-293 
R. 294-296 
R. 300-301 
R. 304-308 
R. 335-336 
R. 337-338 
R.339-340 
R. 341-342 
R. 343-344 
R. 345-346 
R. 347-348 
R. 349-350 
R. 351-352 
R. 353-354 
R. 356-358 
Third Party Identification 
US West 
Terry Frank, personally 
Mark Jensen 
Charles Schwabb 
American Express 
First Security Bank 
Utah C.V. Federal Credit Union 
First Interstate Bank 
A.S. Goldman & Co. 
W.J. Gallagher & Co., Inc. 
Hunifen, Imhoff Clearing Corp. 
Rothchilds Global Investments, Inc. 
Duke & Co., Inc. 
Barnes Banking Co. 
Pam Stam 
Max Greenhaulgh 
Old Republican Title 
Darren Hensley 
Jeremy Ranch Golf & Country Club 
U.S. West 
Mark Jensen 
Mark Jensen 
Terry Frank, personally 
Pam Stam 
Sammy Tall 
Max Greenhaulgh 
U.S. West Cellular 
First Security Bank 
Bank One 
Associated Title 
Bank One Mortgage Corp. 
Terry Frank, personally 
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i n . ) 
(34.) 
(35.) 
(36.) 
(37.) 
(38). 
(39.) 
*(40.) 
•(41.) 
*(42.) 
(43.) 
(44.) 
R. 359-360 
R. 361-363 
R. 364-365 
R. 366-367 
R. 368-370 
R. 373-377 
R. 399-401 
R. 402-405 
R. 406-410 
R. 579-581 
R. 611-615 
R. 616-618 
First Security Bank 
(Exhibit A list of documents not filed) 
Pam Stam 
Darren Hensley 
Sammy Tall 
First Interstate Bank 
(Exhibit A list of documents not filed) 
Mark Jensen 
Plaintiffs father, Clifford L ; 
Terry Frank, personally 
Terry Frank, personally 
Bank One 
Terry Frank, personally 
(Not served; hand note "on vacation") 
(unable to locate return) 
Terry Frank, personally 
(Some of the above-identified third party discovery documents may be duplicates.) 
* U s e d Tiiiml «L"iiui i N u b p i n iiii.ii,, ml of sl.nV, i v !>*->»mtcl subpoena power of the Utah State 
Court. 
** Sought potentially confidential PCP records from third-party without timely prior notice lo 
PCP. 
6. As a theory of her case, Defendant doggedly insisted that Plaintiffs income and 
assets were greater than the amount Plaintiff declared. Defendant, for example, argued 
Plaii itif If had bee oi i ic: ai i owner of PCP, where Plaintiff was employed. 
7. In an effort to quickly and inexpensively resolve the issue, Appellant, Terrance E. 
h a n k I """I" i-, in ink " I , ' ' « i II i in i in II .mi mi II! " " i i p j i l n ,1 II i 'liiKlinf "s iillortry, Mi 11'lsen, with an affidavit, and 
testified: 
I [Terry Frank] am the sole owner of Park City PI iaii: i: i iac) located in Pai 1 : 
City. Cliff Holt [Plaintiff] is an employee only. 
R. 333, paragraph 3. 
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8. Defendant and Mr. Olsen ignored this testimony. Instead, they aggressively sought 
extensive (and grossly over, broad discovery) from many non-parties, including PCP, through Mr. 
Olsen's improper use of his subpoena power. 
9. For example, Mr. Olsen, as an officer of the court and Defendant's counsel, issued 
(or caused to issue) subpoenas and deposition notices to Bank One, PCP's commercial banking 
institution. R. 349-350, 798-803. Specifically, through these Bank One subpoenas, Mr. Olsen 
sought "any and all copies of statements and checks on account number 11231998, Park City 
Pharmacy, 1993, 1994, 1995 and 1996." R. 349-350, 800-803. Copies of these Bank One 
subpoenas and notices of deposition are Exhibit 1 to the Addendum. Mr. Olsen's Bank One notice 
and subpoena were served on Plaintiffs counsel on 11 March 1996. But, they were concealed 
from PCP. No one in a representative capacity for PCP was served with a copy of the Bank One 
subpoenas or deposition notices. PCP was unaware of the seizure of its confidential bank records 
for 1993, 1994, 1995, and 1996 from Bank One until much later. By the time Frank and PCP 
became aware of Defendant's Bank One subpoenas and deposition notices, Defendant and Mr. 
Olsen had possession of more than three (3) years of PCP's bank statements and 4,828 checks from 
PCP's Bank One account. R. 809. 
10. Additionally, as an officer of the court and Defendant's counsel, Mr. Olsen issued 
(or caused to issue) subpoenas for (a) Security Bank, (b) Utah C. V. Credit Union, (c) Barnes 
Banking, and (d) First Interstate Bank, to obtain, among other things, the bank records of PCP. 
See R. 262-270, 281-283, which are the deposition notices, related to these subpoenas, and are 
Exhibit 2 to the Addendum (the subpoenas were not made of record). 
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11. All of Mr. Olsen's bank subpoenas of PCP's banking records were concealed from 
PCP. No one in a representative capacity for PCP was served with the other bank subpoenas and 
rdaicd deposition imiiu" Si - N !<» ' J H\ 'SI :s t M'J' I til u I 7QX KfH PIT htvanne ,)wnre 
of all of Mr. Olsen's subpoenas of PCP's bank records in reviewing the record for this appeal. 
12. Rule 45, Utah Rules of Procedure 
subpoena give "prior notice" to person whose records are to be produced. The purpose of this 
prior notice provision is to afford the affected non-party the opportunity to object to the scope of 
the subpoen.'i, and u pit \ tut llie r\ [uirir :i\nvuvv and illegal use of the subpoena power. 
13. Beyond Rule 45, non-parties have a constitutional expectation of privacy and 
protection agau f 
subpoenas. Mr. Olsen has argued this point in his favor in this mattei R 4vs (Motion) and R. 497 
et seq. (Memorandum). 
14; In the instant Appeal, Mr. Olsen's Bank Subpoenas were issued and served without 
any prior notice to PCP. Absent prior notice of Mr. Olsen's Bank Subpoenas, PCP had no 
opportunity In nfijt 11 In lln" ,"« i ope ol lln 'iuhpoeiids and had no <ipporlunitv to test the - •. -. • 
constitutional validity of the subpoenas before, compliance by the bank. Had PCP been served with 
prior notice of Mi III sen',s bank subpoena . mi uilui . 11111 n n ini, ^cckiut pimliiotioii IP* lv«. 
confidential records, PCP would have sought a protective order just as Frank did when served with 
a personal subpoena. 
15. Rule 45(a)(1)(D) provides: 
[Every subpoena shall] set forth the text of the Notice to Persons Served 
with a Subpoena, in substantially similar form to Form 30 in the Appendix of 
Forms to these rules. 
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A copy of Form 30 is Exhibit 3 to the Addendum, and referred to as the "Form 30 
Notice." 
16. Among other things, the Form 30 Notice provides that if the subpoena commands a 
non-party to produce or permit inspection and copying of documents or other tangible things, such 
non-party has the "right to object if the subpoena. . . c. requires you to disclose a trade secret or 
other confidential research, development or commercial information. . . . " (Emphasis added.) 
17. The Form 30 Notice further provides that after the subpoenaed party has made a 
timely written objection, the subpoenaed party has "no obligation to comply with the subpoena until 
the party serving the subpoena has served you with a court order that compels you to comply." 
18. Mr. Olsen's subpoenas were issued without supplying to the subpoenaed banks the 
Form 30 Notice or anything substantially similar thereto. See, e.g., R. 304-308, 373-377, 402-410, 
and 611-616 Copies of these subpoenas are Exhibit 4 to the Addendum. Therefore, none of the 
subpoenaed banks were put on notice of their right to object. Correspondingly, the subpoenaed 
banks did not notify PCP or Frank of their right to object nor that their private banking records 
were disclosed. 
19. Mr. Olsen's failure to provide the requisite prior notice and failure to include the 
substance of the Form 30 Notice to the subpoenaed banks were not isolated occurrences, nor mere 
oversights. But rather, were the product of Mr. Olsen's pattern and practice of ex parte illegal and 
abusive use of the Subpoena power. From the trial court record, there is no evidence that Mr. 
Olsen ever provided the requisite prior notice or substance of the Form 30 Notice to any 
subpoenaed non-party. 
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JO mplete absence of prior notice to PCP and the Form 30 Notice to the 
subpoenaed non-parties were not the only defects in Mr. Olsen's subpoenas. Some additional 
defec
 o u t u n e a 7 
B. MR. OLSEN'S SECRETARY SIGNED AND ISSUED SUBPOENAS AND 
DEPOSITION NOTICES. 
2 1 . P r i i > i I I1111'1"1."I, n l ' • 111/ ( I ' l l ( llii" I1-1 nil I ulil i". MI. sul r| n i i s With the 1994 
Amendments to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, "an attorney admitted to practice in a court in 
which the action is pending may also issue and sign the subpoei la a s an Dffic = i of tl le ::cn mi: I: P i lie 
45(a)(3), URCP. The increased power of attorneys to issue subpoenas is fiduciary in its nature and 
carries with it a duty to minimize the burden on non-parties and liability for misusing this subpoena 
p 
22. Mr. Olsen did not sign and issue many subpoenas and related deposition notices; but 
to as either "Mr. Olsen's secretary" or "Ms. Bea.ll." 
23. It took a while : . .::. .r counsel 
responding to Frank's Motion for Protective Order and to Quash, Mr. Olsen submitted an affidavit 
outlining the attorneys fees and costs purportedly incurred with respect to the discovery at issue A 
u»(»\ ol Mi I list in , \fYi<liis il I I' MM '' 11 | is l-'xhibil ' In the Addendum. The signature page (R. 
540) shows Mr. Olsen's authentic signature, and the signature of Ms. Beall (her own signature) 
iioliiii/iiig tilt" ullitl.r, ill I lu MI iMliII i i HI l'i In I iknT , illul i * il |ii'i|iltfcMhil i i niiVii'l lm Fi.inl mil 
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PCP: a completely different signature appeared on the subpoena and deposition notice served upon 
Frank, which were at issue. A copy of the Frank subpoena duces tecum (R. 543-546) is Exhibit 6 
to the Addendum. A copy of the related deposition notice (R. 548-550) is Exhibit 7 to the 
Addendum.. 
24. Upon further inspection, Frank and PCP solved the mystery: In the letter supplied 
to Frank with the Frank subpoena and deposition notice, Ms. Beall signed Mr. Olsen's name 
"Mitchell J. Olsen/Lb" indicating that she signed the letter on behalf of Mr. Olsen. A copy of this 
letter (R. 552), is Exhibit 8 to the Addendum. Comparison of Exhibits 6, 7 and 8 conclusively 
show that Ms. Beall, forged Mr. Olsen's signature on the Frank subpoena and deposition notice, 
and thus, Mr. Olsen's secretary purported to issue the Frank subpoena and deposition notice as if 
she were Mr. Olsen and as if she were entitled to indirectly practice law pursuant to a forged 
signature. 
25. When the issue of this impropriety was raised at the trial court, Mr. Olsen cavalierly 
stated "counsel for the Defendant Audrey Holt was out of town and authorized his secretary to sign 
his name." R. 600. Mr. Olsen's excuse for this serious misconduct falsely imply that this was a 
rogue, isolated occurrence. 
26. It was not. Instead, Ms. Beall's improper attempt to issue the Frank Subpoena and 
Deposition Notice formed a part of Mr. Olsen's pattern and practice to abuse the subpoena power 
the court has entrusted to him. Indeed, forged signatures of Mr. Olsen made by Ms. Beall (on 
subpoenas and deposition notices) are displayed at R. 336, 338, 340, 342, 344, 346, 354, 358, 360, 
362, 365, 367, 369, 379, 397, 408, 421, 469, 524, 545, 550, 552, 565, 569, 576 and 594 - twenty 
six (26) separate instances. Copies of these documents are Exhibit 9 to the Addendum. 
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mi i! 11 I u r n s i • 11 1 1 1 11 actice law in the State of Utah. She is not an officer 
of the Court. Nothing in Rules 11, 26, 30, 37, 45, URCP «i 11 sewhere authorized Mr. Olsen's 
secretary to issue subpoenas, deposit ion iiolhv mi si)_>n ollin mini dot uiiinils on brhall nl Mi 
Olsen. 
28 Ms. Beall issued and served Mr. Olsen's subpoenas 1hese functions are stn* 
limited to attorneys licensed to practice law in the State of Utah. Ms. Beall's unauthorized practice 
of law may explain: (a) Mr. Olsen's failure to provide prior notice of Mr. Olsen's subpoenas, and 
'- * he subpoenaed 
parties. It may also explain, to some extent, the other clear and obvious deficiencies in the 
subpoenas which came out c»l \\h < HUTI >, mine. • 
29. A good faith investigation of the facts, review of the law, and Mr. Olsen's 
subpoenas would have cured the defects in such subpoenas which forced the present appeal. 
Fi ir 1:1 lei in 101 c I i li Olsei it 1 itacl i i ,ai p opportunities to cure the defective subpoenas and/or mitigate 
against the harm caused by the subpoenas. But failed to do so 
C. ( "BPOE* 
30. Aside from Mr. Olsen's failure to provide PCP the Rule 45 prior notice and the 
Form 30 Notice to the subpoenaed parties, the subpoenas at issue failed to allou 1:1 lie: • i; eq; lisite 1 ::l 
days after service for the subpoenaed party to comply. Frank was served, in his individual capacity, 
with a Subpoena Duces Tecum on 23 March 1996, demanding his appearance at a deposition and 
I 'l l% ° - * documents, eiyht (8) days later, on 1 April 1996 (R. 
406). 
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31. Additionally, Mr. Olsen's secretary improperly issued and served subpoenas upon 
non-parties located in the States of New York, California, Colorado, Florida, and Washington. See 
R. 258, 260-266, 271-272, 273-274, 275-276, 277-278, 279-280, and 345-346. Thus, these 
subpoenas unlawfully seek to compel production of records well beyond the subpoena power of the 
Third Judicial District Court for the State of Utah. 
32. As yet another example, Mr. Olsen sought to subpoena from Frank, among other 
things, the corporate records of PCP, ignoring the legal separateness of personal and corporate 
interests and personal and representative capacities (R. 544). 
33. Mr. Olsen demonstrates a pattern and practice of improper ex parte use of the 
subpoena power, vested in him as an officer of the Court. 
D. MR OLSEN PUBLICLY USED PCP'S CONFIDENTIAL BANK RECORDS 
BEFORE THE COURT RULED ON PCP'S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER 
34. Mr. Olsen's discovery abuse did not stop with improper use of subpoenas per se. 
Indeed, Defendant, through Mr. Olsen used and published PCP's private and confidential banking 
records after Frank had filed a Motion for Protective Order with the trial court, but before the trial 
court ruled on the Motion. In this Motion, PCP and Frank, specifically sought the protection of 
PCP's confidential banking records from unrestricted public disclosure. Moreover, this occurred 
after the trial court had already granted a Protective Order to another non-party ordering exclusion 
of most of his banking records and protection of the few documents requiring production (R. 454). 
35. Some background facts are helpful to clarify the foregoing. Recall that on 23 March 
1996, Frank was served in a personal capacity commanding him to appear for his deposition, and 
compelling production of personal and PCP documents eight (8) days later on 1 April 1996. R. 
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406. On April 1, 1996, Frank filed individually and as the sole owner of PCP for a Motion for 
Protective Order and Motion to Quash to prevent the disclosure of Frank's personal and PCP's 
corporate records, including PCP's bank accounts. Frank's Motion and supporting Memorandum 
(R. 411-430) are Exhibit 10 to the Addendum. 
36. In this Motion, Frank sought protection of his personal and corporate PCP "banking 
records." (R. 414 to 416). After Frank filed the Motion for Protective Order, but before the trial 
court ruled on that Motion, Mr. Olsen non-confidentially used and thus publicly published, the very 
PCP bank records which were the subject of Frank's pending Motion for a Protective Order (R. 
586). Though Mr. Olsen and counsel for Frank and PCP corresponded and discussed issues 
telephonically, no information was ever conveyed to counsel for Frank and PCP to suggest that the 
confidential bank records of PCP had been obtained from Bank One (R. 585) and were already in 
Mr. Olsen's possession. Mr. Olsen not only secreted the initial Bank One Subpoenas from PCP 
(preventing PCP from objecting or obtaining protection from the Court), but first concealed his 
possession of the same and also prematurely and unilaterally used and publicly disclosed PCP's 
confidential banking records while the Motion for Protective Order by Frank and PCP directly 
pertaining to those records was before the trial court. The facts and circumstances relating to Mr. 
Olsen's devious conduct in this regard are set forth in Frank's Reply in Support of his Motion for 
Protective Order and to Quash (R. 525-552), Exhibit 11 to the Addendum, and Frank and PCP's 
Motion for Sanctions (R. 553-597), Exhibit 12 to the Addendum. 
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37. Mr. Olsen's non-disclosure to Frank and PCP of his possession of and his 
unrestricted public disclosure and use of PCP's confidential bank records is even more egregious in 
view of the trial court action already taken in respect to Plaintiffs father Motion for Protective 
Order concerning his bank records. Defendant subpoenaed banking records from Plaintiffs father, 
Clifford L. Holt, from (a) Security Bank, (b) CV Federal Credit Union, (c) Barnes Banking 
Company, and (d) First Interstate Bank, and sought their records depositions as well. R. 262-264, 
265-267, 268-270, and 281-283. The certificate of service of each of the deposition notices (the 
subpoenas duces tecum were not made of record) clearly shows that Mr. Olsen did not serve 
Clifford L. Holt with prior notice of these Subpoenas or deposition notices. Only Plaintiffs 
counsel was served. R. 264, 267, 270, 283. Fortunately, Plaintiffs father, somehow became aware 
of Mr. Olsen's submarine subpoena efforts. 
38. The Plaintiffs father hired J. Michael Bailey of Parsons, Behle & Latimer to 
challenge Mr. Olsen's subpoena. Mr. Bailey filed a Motion for Protective Order (R. 314-316), 
pursuant to Rule 45(c) URCP, and a Memorandum in Support of the Motion (R. 309-313) to 
protect Mr Holt's bank records from disclosure. As grounds to support the Motion, Mr. Bailey 
argued confidentiality, unavailable consumer or commercial records protected by his constitutional 
rights of privacy and availability of records elsewhere. 
39. The Court substantially granted Mr. Bailey's Motion for Protective Order, 
accommodating only production from bank accounts jointly in the names of Plaintiff and Plaintiffs 
father and/or Plaintiffs son and 1995 or 1996 checks between the Plaintiff and Plaintiffs father (R. 
20 
454-457). The Order, filed April 22, 1996, specifically required that non-jointly held bank records 
"shall not be produced by these banking institutions" and that "counsel for the Defendant" may "noi 
review" any of the bank records of Clifford L. Holt inadvertently produced by the banks and "ta 
immediately transmit them to [Mr. Bailev] counsel for Clifford L. Holt." (Emphasized.) R. 455. 
40. Notwithstanding Frank's pending Motion for Protective Order and Motion to 
Quash, and notwithstanding the great limitations placed by the trial court upon discovery of similar 
banking records sought from Plaintiffs father, Clifford L. Holt, Mr. Olsen cavalierly and callously 
used and publicly published PCP's banking records, while keeping secret from Frank and PCP his 
possession of the same. 
E. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO SANCTION DEFENDANT/MR OLSEN 
41. The initial hearing on Frank's Motion for a Protective Order and to Quash and 
Motion for Sanctions took place on 16 May 1996. A copy of the transcript (R. 726-745 is Exhibit 
13 to the Addendum). During this hearing, the following statements were made by the trial court 
and counsel: 
[MR. OLSEN:] There are thousands [of PCP Bank One checks]. I 
can't make copies of all those. (Emphasis provided). Tr. page 14, lines 3 
through 5. 
[THE COURT:] ... I am asking counsel... to seal the records that are 
questionable.... (Emphasis added). Tr. page 8, lines 2, 9 through 11. 
[THE COURT:]... And I want the [sealed] records [PCP's Bank One 
documents] surrendered to the Court.... (Emphasis supplied.) Tr. page 8, 
lines 12 through 13. 
[MR. FOSTER:] These people do a submarine subpoena. By that I mean 
they did not serve Park City Pharmacy with a copy, and they go directly to 
Park City Pharmacy's bank records in Bank One, get those records, and after 
we have filed our motion for protective order to preserve the confidentiality 
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of these documents, and I am speaking with this man, he does not tell me 
that he has possession of Park City Pharmacy records, concerning which I 
have asserted a claim of confidentiality. But, rather, he takes Mr. Holt's 
deposition, and exposes those documents as exhibits on a nonconfidential 
basis, and then I learn about it after the deposition, that our documents have 
been obtained without our knowledge, from our bank, and no effort has been 
made to put them under seal, to advise me, so that I can come to this Court 
and say, your Honor, we have an objection to these being provided. We 
want a protective order, if they are relevant. We want them excluded, if they 
are not relevant. It seems to me reasonable. (Emphasized.) Tr. page 4, line 
20 through page 5, line 13. 
[THE COURT:] And the Court thinks that's reasonable, also. Tr. page 5, 
lines 12 through 13. 
**** 
[MR. FOSTER:] ....I have never seen anybody not appropriately serve 
copies of subpoenas, not honor a motion for a protective order, and file a 
motion for attorney's fees, and file a motion to compel. Just mind-boggling. 
Tr. page 7, lines 9 through 14. 
[THE COURT:] The Court is going to honor your position. (Emphasized.) 
Tr. page 7, lines 11-16. 
* * * * 
[THE COURT:] ...seal the records that are questionable in any way as 
having any bearing in this lawsuit. We will give you the protective order. 
And I want the records surrendered to the Court, and they will be under a 
protective order. (Emphasis added.) Tr. page 8, lines 10-14. 
[MR. OLSEN:] All I have is the [PCP Bank One] checks. You ordered they 
be sealed and delivered to the Court. I will do that. Tr. page 13, lines 20-
21. 
[THE COURT:] It is denied. The Court will not require the production of 
that [Jeremy Ranch Country Club] evidence. (Emphasized ) Tr. page 12, 
lines 5-6. R. 737. 
[THE COURT:] The Court is going to take the question of fees and costs 
under advisement.... Tr. page 19, lines 1-2. 
Also see R. 647. 
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42. Subsequently, on 23 August 1996, the Court addressed and denied Frank's and 
PCP's request for attorneys fees contained in Frank's Motion for Protective Order and Motion to 
Quash and Frank's Motion for Sanctions. (R. 873, 874). A copy of the transcript of the 23 August 
1996 hearing (R. 861-876) is Exhibit 14 to the Addendum. The formal Order of the Court denying 
Frank's request for attorneys fees (R. 810-811) is Exhibit 15 to the Addendum. 
43. Frank and PCP appeal this order. 
VI. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
A, PCP has a constitutionally protected right of privacy in respect to its confidential 
banking records. Defendant, through Mr. Olsen, obtained PCP's banking records directly from 
PCP's banks, the custodians of PCP's confidential records, without providing PCP any "prior 
notice" before the executor of the subpoenas as the Utah Constitution and Rule 45, URCP require. 
Defendant, through Mr. Olsen, also failed to provide PCP's banks with notice of their rights to 
object to the subpoena, as required by Rule 45, URCP, and exemplified by URCP Form 30 
("Notice to Persons Served With a Subpoena"). Through these tactics, Defendant obtained, and 
used to her benefit in the divorce proceeding, all of PCP's confidential banking records covering a 
three-year period. The trial court erred in failing to find that Defendant and Mr. Olsen breached 
their duties to PCP and PCP's banks by failing to provide PCP and its banks with notice of the 
subpoenas prior to their execution as required by the Utah Constitution and Rule 45, URCP. 
B. Only the Clerk of the Court and an attorney admitted to practice in this state, "as an 
officer of the court" may sign and issue subpoenas pursuant to Rules 11 and 45, URCP. Only 
attorneys and pro se litigants may issue and sign deposition notices pursuant to Rules 11, 26, and 
30, URCP Mr. Olsen improperly authorized his legal secretary to issue and sign the subpoena 
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duces tecum and deposition notice served upon Frank. The trial court erred in failing to find that 
the subpoena duces tecum and deposition notice served upon Frank were (a) void ab initio, (b) 
issued in violation of Rule 45, URCP, and (c) issued in violation of Rule 11, URCP. 
Defendant, through Mr. Olsen, demonstrated a clear pattern and practice of wantonly 
abusing the subpoena power vested in him as an officer of the court. The above referenced issues 
are just a couple of many examples provided in this brief. The trial court erred in failing to award 
PCP and Frank the costs and attorney's fees they incurred in filing and prosecuting their Motion for 
Protective Order, Motion to Quash, and Motion for Sanctions, all of which were required to raise 
and resolve the issues created by Defendant and Mr. Olsen's egregiously improper conduct. The 
trial court also erred in not imposing sanctions against Defendant and Mr. Olsen as a form of 
punishment for their misconduct and to serve as a general deterrence in the future. 
VH. ARGUMENT 
A. MR OLSEN'S SUBMARINE SUBPOENAS - ISSUED AND SERVED WITHOUT 
THE REQUISITE PRIOR NOTICE AND WITHOUT THE FORM 30 NOTICE-
VIOLATED PCP'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF PRIVACY, VIOLATED 
RULE 45, AND MANDATE SERIOUS SANCTIONS 
Defendant failed to provide Frank or PCP with any notice of Mr. Olsen's subpoenas 
to banks for PCP records and provided defective notice to Frank personally. Rule 45 clearly 
requires the subpoenaing party to provide "prior notice" of any commanded production or 
inspection of documents. URCP 45(b)(1)(A). "The purpose of this notice to afford the other 
parties. . . the opportunity to object to the production [of documents] or inspection [of peramises] 
and was inserted into the rule to prevent ex parte abusive and illegal use of the subpoena power. 
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United States v. Santiago-LugoT 904 F.Supp. 43, 47 (D.P. R. 1995). Any subpoenas issued and 
served without prior notice is null and void. Id- at 48; see also Callanan v. Riggers & Erectors, 
Inc.. 149 F.R.D. 519, 520 (D.R.I. 1992). 
The "prior notice" requirement in Rule 45 has constitutional underpinnings. The 
Utah Supreme Court has held that persons are constitutionally protected "against unreasonable 
searches and seizures of their bank statements, checks, bonds, loan applications, loan guarantees, 
and all papers which [they] supplied to the bank to facilitate the conduct of [their] financial affairs 
upon a reasonable assumption that the information would remain confidential." State v. Thompson. 
810 P.2d 415, 418 (Utah 1991). 
The Supreme Court in Thompson recognized a right of privacy in bank papers of an 
individual who was charged with criminal offenses. However, a person's constitutional right of 
privacy clearly extends to banking records subpoenaed in a civil lawsuit. See, e.g., Mann v. 
University of Cincinnati. 152 F.R.D. 119 (S.D. Ohio 1993) Santiago-Lugo. 904 F. Supp. 47-48. In 
fact, even government agencies conducting official investigations in Utah can only obtain 
confidential financial information once they have obtained a written order of the court, and they 
must give notice to the person whose confidential bank records they are going to subpoena. See 
State v. Waite. 803 P.2d 1279, 1281 (Utah App. 1990) (interpreting Utah's Financial Information 
Privacy Act, UCA § § 78-27-45 to 50.) 
A person's constitutional right to notice prior to the execution of a subpoena of their 
financial records was upheld by an En Banc. Colorado Supreme Court when it stated as follows: 
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Charnes [like Thompson] establishes that under the Colorado Constitution a bank 
customer has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the bank's records of the 
customer's financial transactions. As a result, those records are protected by the 
Colorado Constitution against unreasonable searches and seizures. The core value 
to which the constitutional protection is extended is the customer's privacy interest. 
In order to give effect to that protection, the customer must have an opportunity 
to test the constitutional validity of an administrative subpoena before it is 
executed. 
People vs. Lamb. 732 P.2d 1216, 1220 (Colo. 1987) (emphasis added). 
A New York Federal Court was faced with a similar situation in a civil context where no 
prior notice of a subpoena for confidential records had been given to the affected non-party. 
In this situation the court believes that fair play demands that formal notice in 
accordance with the requirements of due process be served upon an owner of books 
and records by the person who subpoenas a third party custodian to produce such 
books and records, before production is required. Only in this manner may an 
owner have an opportunity to be heard in order to protect his rights and interests 
which may extend far beyond the books and records themselves. 
Alma - Schuhfabrik Ag. vs. Rosenthal. 25 F.R.D. 100, 101 (E.D.N. Y. 1960)(emphasis added). 
Consistent with the constitutional importance of the prior notice, Rule 45 (c)(1) imposes a 
duty on the issuing attorney to minimize the burden on non-parties. The Utah Advisory Committee 
Notes on the 1994 Amendment provide: 
Subparagraph (c)(1) states that the duty of an attorney to minimize the 
burden on a witness who is not a party, and specifies such witnesses may 
recover lost earnings [and attorneys fees] that result from the misuse of a 
subpoena. Subparagraph (c)(1) expands responsibility of an attorney stated 
in Rule 26(g): this responsibility is correlated to the expanded power of an 
attorney to issue a subpoena. (Emphasis added.) 
As a Federal District Court recently emphasized in respect to the importance of attorney's duty to 
non-parties: 
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With the increased power of attorneys regarding the issuance of criminal and 
civil subpoenas, the liability of the attorney from misusing the subpoena rules 
is greater. The mere fact that an attorney abuses the subpoena power 
directly implicates the court itself and creates an embarrassment for the 
institution. In addition, the general duty of an attorney toward third-parties 
who have violated when a subpoena is misused. Rule 4.4 of the Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct. . . forbids the use of methods of obtaining 
evidence that violate the legal rights of third-persons. . . . [A]buse of the 
subpoena power is an actionable tort. 
Santiago-Lugo. 904 F.Supp. at 48 (Model Rule 4.4 is followed by the Utah State Bar). 
Simply put, a party may not surreptitiously obtain private records without providing the 
requisite prior notice. Mann v. University of Cincinnati. 152F.R.D. 119 (S.D.Ohio 1993). In 
Mann the conduct of defense counsel was called into question "who, knowing that Ms. Mann 
objected to their review of her medical records due to the private information contained therein and 
that her attorney was studying the question whether to release relevant medical records, 
nevertheless issued a subpoena duces tecum for all of Ms. Mann's medical records, regardless of 
their relevancy." Defense counsel then had the records produced and reviewed them before the 
time for production called for in their subpoena. 
The Mann court stated that: 
There can be no question that the aforementioned information is of such a private 
nature that a constitutional right to privacy exists. In a civilized society in the 
year 1993, where vast amounts of personal information are contained not only in 
medical files but in computerized data banks or other massive government files, 
much of which is personal in character and potentially embarrassing or harmful if 
disclosed, the constitutional right to privacy is surely as significant as the protection 
of commercial information specifically recognized by Rule 45(c)(3)(B)(i). At 
least two privacy interests regarding medical records are implicated. The first, of 
course, is right to non-disclosure of private information. The "right to be let 
alone" is "the right most valued by civilized men." 
Id- at 125 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
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The confidentiality of PCP's and Frank's banking records is constitutionally protected. The 
prior notice provisions in Rule 45, and the Form 30 Notice, if followed, assure that before the 
execution of the subpoena the non-party will have an opportunity to (a) test the constitutional 
validity of a subpoena concerning its banking records, (b) object to the scope of a subpoena 
concerning their banking records, and (c) seek protection in the form of a protective order from 
unrestricted public disclosure of their confidential banking records. Instead of honoring and 
following these procedural safeguards, Mr. Olsen trampled PCP's constitutional right of privacy. 
Without providing PCP prior notice and without providing the subpoenaed banks the Form 
30 Notice, Mr. Olsen's Bank Subpoenas procurred all of PCP's constitutionally private bank 
statements and checks for a period of time in excess of three years. 
PCP had no opportunity to object to Mr. Olsen's bank subpoenas because they were 
concealed from PCP. PCP had no opportunity to test the constitutional validity of Mr. Olsen's 
bank subpoenas. PCP had no opportunity to obtain a protective order to prevent unrestrictive 
public disclosure of this sensitive and confidential financial information. Indeed, before PCP 
learned of Mr. Olsen's unlawful search and seizure of PCP's banking records, Mr. Olsen non-
confidentially used and publicly published some of PCP's private banking records by using them in 
a deposition. Mr. Olsen's conduct was ex parte unconstitutional, illegal and an abusive use of the 
trust-like subpoena power vested in him as an officer of the court. Mr. Olsen should be seriously 
sanctioned for his egregious misconduct. 
The trial court refused PCP's and Frank's request for attorney fees; the trial court made no 
findings of fact upon which it based the denial of PCP's and Frank's request for attorney fees; the 
trial eourt failed to make any conclusions (specific or general) as to whether (a) Mr. Olsen violated 
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PCP and Frank's constitutional right of privacy in their bank records, (b) Mr. Olsen wrongfully 
failed to give PCP prior notice, or (c) Mr. Olsen improperly failed to provide the subpoenaed 
parties with the Form 30 Notice.2 The trial court erred and must be reversed. 
Findings of fact serve two important purposes: (1) informing the parties of the trial court's 
analysis, and (2) providing a basis for review by the appellate court. See Dover Elevator Co. v. Hill 
Mangum Invs.. 766 P.2d 424, 426 (Utah App. 1988). Generally, the failure of the trial court to 
make findings on all material issues is reversible error unless facts in the record are clear, 
uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding in favor of judgment. Butler v. Pinecrest 
Pipeline Operating Co.. 909 P.2d 225, 231-232 (Utah 1995)(remanding for findings of fact and 
conclusions of law regarding sanctions award). Specifically, the trial court's findings of fact must 
show that the trial court's judgment follows logically from and is supported by the evidence. 
Moreover, with respect to an award of attorney's fees, Utah courts have routinely required findings 
of fact supported by the evidence and appropriate conclusions of law. See, e.g., Cabrera v. 
CottrelL 694 P.2d 622, 624-625 (Utah 1985) ("[0]n a number of occasions, we have held that 
attorney fees should be awarded on the basis of evidence and that findings of fact should be made 
which support the award.1'). 
Trial court findings of fact and conclusions of law are necessary in Rule 11 determinations 
2Understandably, the trial court simply wanted to bring an end to "a very 
acrimonious, cantankerous, long, drawn-out [divorce] lawsuit, where there have been 
allegations and counter-allegations of deceit and subterfuge and concealment and non-
compliance and non-cooperation, nauseam." R. 874, lines 1-5; Addendum Exhibit 14 
(transcript of the 23 August 1996 hearing). See also R. 732, lines 19-24; R. 745, lines 1-16, 
18-19; Addendum Exhibit 13 (transcript of the 16 May 1996 hearing). Bringing an end 
to a hostile divorce case and minimizing the parties legal expenses are worthy 
objectives, they do not override the duty of litigants and their attorneys to abide by 
constitutional protection of non-parties. 
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so as to enable the appellate court to properly conduct its three standard of review process for 
reviewing a trial court's Rule 11 determination. See Barnard v. Sutliff 846 P.2d 1229 (Utah 
1992). For instance, the first step in the appellate review of Rule 11 determination is a review of 
the trial court's findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard. Id. With no findings of fact, 
the appellate court cannot properly perform this first step. Likewise, the second step of the Rule 11 
appellate comprises a review of the trial court's legal conclusions under the correction of error 
standard. Li. Again, with no legal conclusions provided by the trial court, the appellate court is 
not able to properly conduce this second step. The third step of Rule 11 appeal reviews the trial 
court's determinations as to the type and amount of sanctions under the abuse of discretion 
standard. M. Without having reviewed the findings of fact or conclusions of law, it is impossible 
to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion. 
Here, the facts are clear, uncontroverted, and clearly of support, indeed require, only a 
finding that Mr. Olsen's wantonly abuse of his fiduciary subpoena power vested in him as an officer 
of the court. If not reversed, the trial court's inaction would create a dangerous precedent, perhaps 
a license for further non-party discovery. 
When considering litigation tactics, litigants and their attorneys always balance the risk 
versus the reward. Here, Mr. Olsen's reward for misusing his subpoena power is evident: he 
obtained all of PCP's confidential banking records — three years bank statements and checks — 
initially without incident and with little, if any, corrective action by the trial court. Because he 
failed to provide the constitutionally required prior notice to PCP and the Form 30 Notice to the 
subpoenaed banks, Mr. Olsen did not face any objections, motions for protective order or any other 
obstacles to this production. Moreover, with no protective order in place to safe guard the 
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confidentiality of PCP private banking records, Defendant and Mr. Olsen could use and did use that 
information however they saw fit in an attempt to advance Defendant's interests in the divorce 
proceeding. How convenient to Defendant and Mr. Olsen. How, unlawful, unconstitutional and 
unfortunate for PCP. 
What were the risks of Mr. Olsen's approach? Almost none. The trial court let Defendant 
and Mr. Olsen offscott free. Inconsequently, the court entered a Protective Order first sealing 
PCP's banking records and later ordering them destroyed; but, this occurred after the Defendant 
and Mr. Olsen had used and unconstitutionally publicly disclosed PCP's confidential information. 
PCP and Frank spent more than $8,000 in fees and costs to raise and resolve these issues. R. 873; 
Addendum, Exhibit 14. No punishment. No sanctions. Little real world risk. 
If unabated, litigant's attorneys have little, if anything to lose in grossly misusing the 
subpoena power. Inaction by the Court of Appeals would merely enlarge an already too often 
misused weapon in the arsenal of "Rambo litigators." They can overzealously advocate their client's 
interest instead of discharging their duties as officers of the court. Any action This is wrong. 
Non-parties' constitutional rights of privacy must not be subordinated to the litigants' 
zealous interests, at the discretion of the litigant's attorney in violation of his or her fiduciary duty 
as an officer of the court. The Court of Appeals must issue here a warning trumpet that: litigants 
and their attorneys may not abuse the subpoena power with impunity. When an attorney abuses 
subpoena power, it directly implicates the court itself, and creates an embarrassment for the 
judiciary. Santiago-Lugo, supra. Attorney abuse of the subpoena power also undermines public 
confidence in the judicial system. Mr. Olsen's subpoena abuse was not a simple and isolated 
incidence, but a pattern and practice. The abuse was not a harmless mistake nor is it limited to a 
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single occurrence. It was wanton and of unconstitutional proportions. Serious sanctions must 
issue. Strict enforcement of the attorneys' duties to non-parties in the use of the subpoena power 
vested in them as officers of the court will curtail, if not substantially eliminate, the abuse of this 
power.3 
B. MR OLSEN ISSUED, THROUGH HIS SECRETARY, DEFECTIVE AND 
FACIALLY INVALID SUBPOENAS 
It is axiomatic that a subpoena must be validly executed before it can lawfully compel a 
person's appearance or the production of documents. In gross violation of Rules 11, 26, 30, 37 
and 45, URCP, Mr. Olsen's secretary, Ms. Beall, purported to issue the subpoena duces tecum and 
deposition notice served upon Frank. This was not, as Mr. Olsen had implied, an isolated 
occurrence. In fact, Ms. Beall forged Mr Olsen's signature on as many as twenty-six (26) 
subpoenas and deposition notices in this case. See Addendum, Exhibit 9. This demonstrates a 
disturbing pattern and practice of grossly improper delegation by Mr. Olsen. 
Even a casual reading of the applicable rules demonstrates that an attorney's secretary 
cannot properly notice depositions nor issue subpoenas commanding persons to appear to produce 
documents and give testimony. Under Rule 45(a)(3) only the Clerk of the Court, and "an 
3If the Court of Appeals does not send this strong message, attorney abuse of the 
subpoena power may spawn unnecessary satellite litigation. "[A]buse of the subpoena 
power is an actionable tort" Santiago-Lugo, 904 F.Supp. at 48. In addition, where the 
attorney acts as "an officer of the court", Rule 45(c), URCP, the attorney's failure to 
provide prior notice before a non-party's confidential banking records are searched and 
seized would result in an unconstitutional depravation of the non-party's civil rights. If 
the injured non-party cannot obtain relief from the court which issued the subpoena, 
the only way the non-party will get relief is by pursuing such claims. In our litigious 
society, the Court of Appeals should adopt policies and positions which reduce, not 
enlarge the docket of our state courts. 
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attorney admitted to practice in the Court in which the action is pending" may issue and sign 
subpoenas "as an officer of the court" (Emphasis added). Historically, courts have carefully 
guarded the subpoena power. The change to allow attorneys to directly and unilaterally issue 
subpoenas occurred only three years ago. The Advisory Committee Notes make it clear that the 
attorney issuing subpoenas has a "duty" to "minimize the burden" on non-parties, which duty is 
"correlative to the expanded power of an attorney to issue a subpoena." A copy of Rule 45 and the 
Advisory Committee Notes are appended hereto as Exhibit 19. (See also Santiago-Lugo. 904 
F.Supp. 48 quoted at page 26, supra). 
Ms. Beall is not licensed to practice law. She is not a Clerk of the Court. She is not an 
officer of the court. The legislature and the courts never have and never will share the subpoena 
power with an attorney's non-licensed staff members. Mr. Olsen's irresponsible attempts to 
delegate the jealously guarded responsibility to issue subpoenas and deposition notices to his 
secretary not only is an egregious violation of Rule 45, but also constitutes the unethical sponsoring 
of the unauthorized practice of law. Such conduct never has and never will be tolerated. 
Ms. BealPs signature on the subpoenas and deposition notices also violate Rule 11, URCP, 
which provides: 
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an 
attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual 
name who is duly licensed to practice in the state of Utah. . . . [Signature 
of an attorney constitutes a certification by him that he has read the 
pleading, motion or other paper, that to the best of his knowledge. 
information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in 
fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for an 
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not 
interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause 
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation (emphasis 
added). 
UtahR. Civ. P., Rule 11 (1997). 
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Ms. BeaH's signature, when Mr. Olsen is "out of town," does not fulfill Mr. Olsen's Rule 11 
requirements. But rather, constitutes a misrepresentation to the Court, to opposing counsel, and to 
the non-parties served or affected that the subpoenas and deposition notices have been signed by 
the attorney. Mr. Olsen's practice short circuits the certification mandate of Rule 11. At best, Mr. 
Olsen's practice is sloppy and should subject him to severe sanctions; at worst, it is seriously 
unethical and unprofessional. 
This point was stressed in the analogous case of In re Edward Lewis Hohn. 1671 Ariz. 59, 
832, P.2d 192 (1992). There, an attorney was involved in a disciplinary proceeding, and the 
lawyer's "secretary used a rubber stamp signature" on original documents filed in respect to the 
proceeding. In regard to the improper use of the rubber stamp, the Arizona Supreme Court noted: 
If Rule 11, Ariz. Civ. P. . . . applied to bar disciplinary cases, a matter we 
need not decide at this time, respondent's conduct clearly would have 
violated that rule, as it requires an unrepresented party to sign pleadings or 
other papers to certify their contents. Even if Rule 11 does not apply, 
respondent's methods demonstrate an improperly cavalier attitude toward 
bar discipline matters. 
M. at 544, 832 P.2d at 197 (holding that the aggravating factor of using the rubber stamp 
warranted additional sanctions against Hohn). 
Like the signature stamp In re Hohn. Ms. Beall's practice of signing for Mr. Olsen should 
be condemned as a practice "clearly violating Rule 11," and a practice which "demonstrates an 
improperly cavalier attitude" toward the litigation process. Id. at 197. 
To allow non-lawyers to sign subpoenas, deposition notices and other court documents 
represents an egregious discovery abuse. It does not show adequate respect for the subpoena 
power of the court; it circumvents the certification purpose of Rule 11. This is not a mere technical 
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deficiency. Mr. Olsen's deliberate misconduct which runs to the very heart of the judicial process.4 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the trial court refused to evaluate, seriously consider or grant 
PCP's and Frank's requests for attorneys fees. 
Preoccupied with bringing an end to a nasty divorce proceeding, see note 2, supra the trial 
court made no findings of fact upon which it based the denial of PCP's and Frank's requests for 
attorneys fees; failed to make any conclusions (general or specific) as to whether (a) Mr. Olsen 
violated his duty to PCP and Frank by improperly delegating his subpoena power to his secretary, 
(b) whether Mr. Olsen violated Rules 11 and 45 in improperly delegating to his secretary, Ms. 
Beall, the power to sign and issue subpoenas and deposition notices. 
PCP and Frank vigorously maintain that the facts here are clear, uncontroverted, and 
capable of supporting no other finding except that sanctions should issue against defendant and/or 
Mr. Olsen.5 Any other action would be construed as an indirect endorsement and ratification of 
such improper tactics (because they implicate the court itself), created an embarrassment for the 
court, and erode the public confidence in lawyers in general and the judicial system in particular. 
On this important issue, the Court of Appeals should reverse and send a message to litigants and 
their attorneys that the subpoena power of the court will be jealously guarded and regulated; and 
the Rule 11 certification by attorneys (not their secretaries), even on subpoenas and deposition 
notices, will be absolutely mandatory, no exception. 
4Indeed, Ms. Beall's signature as it were Mr. Olsen's signature is regarded as a 
forgery under Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-501. 
5CF. Butler, 909 P.2d at 231-32 (the failure of the trial court to make findings on 
all material issues is reversible error unless facts in the record are clear, uncontroverted 
and capable of supporting only a finding in favor of the judgment). See also Barnard v. 
Sutli£f,846P.2datl229. 
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C. MR. OLSEN DEMONSTRATES A PATTERN AND PRACTICE OF WANTON EX 
PARTE ILLEGAL AND ABUSIVE USE OF THE SUBPOENA POWER; THIS 
MERITS SERIOUS SANCTIONS 
The subject of sanctions are among the most distasteful for the court and counsel. 
Although considered harsh, serious sanctions are necessary and appropriate when a litigation party 
engages in a "pattern" of discovery abuse. W.W. Gardner Inc. v. Park West Village Inc.. 568 P.2d 
734, 738 (Utah 1977) ("a defendant may not ignore with impunity" the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure.) The court system possess and must exercise its inherent power to protect the 
administration of justice by levying sanctions in response to abusive litigation practices. Roadway 
Express Inc. v. Piper. 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980); Schonev v. Memorial Estates. Inc.. 790 P.2d 584, 
585 (Utah App. 1990). 
The Federal District Court in Ohio addressed the issue of appropriate sanctions, where a 
party violated anothers constitutional right of privacy by improperly subpoenaing records: 
With respect to sanctions under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, we 
observe that 'the court has wide discretion in selecting the appropriate 
sanctions' (citation). Similarly, the courts 'have inherent power to impose a 
variety of sanctions on both litigants and attorneys' (citations). One of the 
prominent goals of imposing sanctions is deterrence (citation). Thus, the 
United States Supreme Court stated in considering sanctions under Rule 37, 
'here, as in other areas of the law, the most severe in the spectrum of 
sanctions provided by statute or rule must be available to the district court in 
appropriate cases not merely to penalize those whose conduct may be 
deemed to warrant such sanction, but to deter those who might be tempted 
to such conduct in the absence of such deterrence' (citations). 
Furthermore, although deterrence is the principal goal of imposing sanctions, 
(citations), 'compensatory and punitive purposes are also served' and 
therefore 'courts may fashion sanctions to serve purposes not specifically 
discussed by the advisory committee.' Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. 
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, E g t o l Rules of Civil Procedure § 
1336 (1990); See William W. Schwarzer, Sanction Under the New Federal 
Rule 11 - A Closer Look. 104 F.R.D. 181, 201 (1985) ('[t]he rule reflects a 
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dual purpose; compensating the offending party for the expense caused by 
the violation as well as penalizing the offender to achieve special and general 
deterrence. In assessing the gravity of the violation, therefore, the court 
should determine the extent to which the violation reflects a deliberate effort 
to misuse or abuse the litigation process') (citation). Consequently, the 
court may impose a fine 'as light as a censure and as heavy as is justified — a 
fine that may exceed the amount of fees incurred by the opposing party' 
(citation). 
Mann. 152 F.R.D. at 126-27. 
Mr. Olsen has demonstrated a pattern and practice of improper non-party discovery through 
subpoenas and deposition notices: 
(1) Mr. Olsen issued as many as eleven (11) subpoenas which sought PCP's confidential 
proprietary information from non-party custodians of PCP's records, without 
providing PCP the "prior notice" the Utah Constitution and Rule 45 requires; 
(2) All subpoenas Mr. Olsen issued (dozens in this case) uniformly failed to supply the 
parties served with a subpoena the Form 30 Notice required by Rule 45, leaving the 
subpoenaed non-parties unaware of their rights to object; 
(3) Mr. Olsen allowed his secretary, Mr. Beall, to purportedly issue and sign as many as 
twenty-six (26) subpoenas and deposition notices in this case; 
(4) Mr. Olsen unlawfully served Third Judicial District Court subpoenas to non-parties 
located in the states of New York, California, Colorado, Florida and Washington, 
well beyond the trial court's subpoena power; 
(5) Mr. Olsen's subpoenas failed to allow at least 14 days after service for the 
subpoenaed party to comply with the subpoena; 
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(6) Mr. Olsen's subpoenas improperly requested corporate records from individuals 
who owned or worked for the corporation; 
(7) Mr. Olsen used PCP's wrongfully obtained private and confidential banking records 
of PCP qfter Frank and PCP filed a Motion for Protective Order with respect to 
those banking records, but before the trial court ruled on PCP's Motion; and 
(8) In respect to all of the foregoing obvious and egregious violations, Mr. Olsen has 
demonstrated a cavalier and arrogant attitude, instead of showing remorse for his 
egregious misconduct. Mr. Olsen made no effort to cure, mitigate or otherwise 
correct his discovery violation and the harm so caused. 
Under these circumstances, Mr. Olsen should receive severe sanctions which correlate to 
the seriousness of the violations, his lack of corrective action or regret, and harm done to and 
burden placed upon Frank and PCP. Consistent with the guidance provided by Mann, Defendant 
and Mr. Olsen should be sanctioned in a sufficient amount to compensate PCP and Frank for the 
attorneys fees and costs they have incurred to raise and resolve these serious issues both at the trial 
and appellate levels. Further, as a penalty and source of general deterrence, a punitive sanction 
should be imposed upon Mr. Olsen. 
CONCLUSION 
The issues raised in this Appeal are of first impression. The Utah Court of Appeals will, 
through this Appeal, help define the legal and ethical obligations all litigants and their attorneys owe 
non-parties. The practice of law remains a highly honored profession. Litigants and their attorneys 
must vigilantly protect the rights of the non-parties. If the litigants must subpoena records from 
non-parties, the non-parties must receive notice, prior to the execution of the subpoena so that they 
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may have an opportunity to test the constitutional validity of the subpoena, object as necessary, and 
obtain protection from the court to prevent unrestricted public disclosure of their confidential 
information. 
The subpoena power bestowed upon attorneys licensed to practice in Utah must be 
respected. It cannot be delegated to an attorney's secretary or other staff members. Such improper 
delegation demonstrates intolerable disrespect for the subpoena power of the court. 
The Utah Court of Appeals, can, through this Appeal, send a clear, professional and 
important message, in unambiguous terms. An attorney may not wantonly ex parte abuse of the 
subpoena power vested in him or her as an officer of the court with impunity. This important 
message will help re-establish public confidence in the honorable legal profession. It will also serve 
as a guide post, a beacon of light by which the discovery rights of non-parties will be safeguarded in 
the future. 
Dated this 21st day of May, 1997 
FOSTER & FOSTER L.C. 
^ J n n G. F^tir 
Brett L. Foster 
Attorneys for the Appellants 
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